What an investing shareholder should know;

              ATLANTA PITTSBURGH
BALTIMORE HASKINS & S E L LS PORTLAND
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON PROVIDENCE
SAINT LOUIS
BROOKLYN SALT LAKE CITY
BUFFALO
CHARLOTTE CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
CHICAGO SEATTLE
CINCINNATI TULSA
CLEVELAND WATERTOWN
DALLAS BULLETIN DENVER
DETROIT
JACKSONVILLE BERLIN
LONDON
MANILA
PARIS
SHANGHAI
KANSAS CITY LOS ANGELES MINNEAPOLIS NEWARK E X E C U T I V E O F F I C ES
NEW ORLEANS 30 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK HAVANA
NEW YORK MEXICO CITY
PHILADELPHIA MONTREAL
VOL. X NEW YORK, JANUARY, 1927 No. 1
What an Investing Shareholder Should Know
THE typical stockholder, in whose be-half
the sentimental agitators are
waging such vigorous warfare, probably
is the one least worried over the possible
tendency to disenfranchise him. Prac­tically,
he is concerned with the extent
and regularity of dividends, with the
safety of his investment, with the ex­change
value of his stock, and with its
marketability. Given these, he cares
little whether or not he votes. He will
avoid it if possible, responding usually to
the second request for proxies sent out
by the corporation officials.
The atypical stockholder sends proxies
to no one. He attends the meetings in
person. He makes speeches and protests
often over some insignificant or unimpor­tant
matter. He is heard respectfully, his
protest may be recorded, but judging from
outward appearances he might as well
have saved his time and breath.
These illustrations do not apply to cases
wherein the shares are closely held. The
use of shares in such cases is confined gen­erally
to gaining advantage in personal
squabbles which develop between fac­tions.
No public spirited champions of
democracy are needed in the premises.
The attorneys usually look after the legal
rights of the parties.
The typical shareholder whose interests
are being so zealously conserved is the in­dividual
who owns ten shares of "Strumo."
A sorry spectacle he would make of at­tempting
to exercise effectively the pro­prietary
right of voice in the manage­ment
with which theoretically he becomes
vested by reason of stock ownership.
In modern corporation procedure, theory
and practice often clash; practice usually
wins.
The wrong of non-voting stock, as the
matter is viewed by the average citizen,
lies in the fact that any possibility of
organizing a minority group to the point
of making its voice heard is irretrievably
removed. Natural human pride which
might cause an individual to resent being
denied the right to vote, perhaps would be
conversely affected if the right were to be
extended even though there might be no
practical way of making the right effective.
These ruminations, however, lead to no
solution of the problem.
If there is anything in the idea that
shareholders should have the right to vote,
a new form of stock might be devised
which, while non-voting, ordinarily would
become endowed with that power auto­matically
under certain conditions. Thus,
failure to declare dividends, or to main­tain
dividend rates already established,
failure to maintain a satisfactory financial